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3 AKRON LAW REVIEW (1)
CRIMINAL LAW-INFANTICIDE--REQUIREMENT
THAT THE VICTIM BE BORN ALIVE
State v. Dickinson, 18 Ohio Misc. 151 (1969)
On December 24, 1967, the defendant, while operating his
automobile in Canton, Ohio, attempted to pass another car and,
while left of center, crashed head-on with an oncoming auto-
mobile. An occupant of the oncoming automobile was seven
months pregnant. She was admitted to the Altman hospital suf-
fering from contusions and multiple lacerations of the chest and
abdomen and a fracture of the left knee. Slightly less than
twelve hours after the collision, the mother aborted a stillborn
female infant. After an autopsy of the fetus the coroner ruled
that death had been caused by Hypoxia (oxygen insufficiency),
"due to placental hemorrhage, due to uterine contusion, (and)
as a direct result of the above described traffic accident." 1
According to the testimony of the coroner, the fetus was viable
at the time of the accident. The defendant was indicted for
homicide by vehicle in the first degree, allegedly having caused
the death of the viable but unborn fetus. Defendant pleaded not
guilty, waived his right to trial by jury, and was tried by a judge
of the court. He was convicted and sentenced to one to twenty
years in the Ohio Penitentiary.
This case is unique, because it is the first time a court has
imposed a conviction of homicide for the death of a viable un-
born fetus caused by an unlawful but unintentional act.
The evidence is persuasive beyond a reasonable doubt that
the defendant was operating a motor vehicle while under the
influence of alcohol, without due regard for the safety and rights
of others, and in such a manner as to endanger the life or prop-
erty of other persons in lawful use of the streets and highways.2
The soundness of the court's finding depends upon a deter-
mination of the following issue: whether the legislature con-
templated inclusion of a "viable unborn fetus" in the definition
of the word "person" as it is used in the statute. In support of
the conviction the court stated:
1 State v. Dickinson, 18 Ohio Misc. 151 (1969).
2 This constitutes a violation of §§ 4511.19 and 4511.20 of Ohio Rev. Code.
The Homicide by Vehicle statute, § 4511.181 Ohio Rev. Code, reads: "No
person shall unlawfully and unintentionally cause the death of another




Wilfong: State v. Dickinson
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1970
RECENT CASES
"The vehicular homicide statute clearly limits the crime
to the death of a 'person.' In the sense intended that must
mean a living individual. The medical evidence establishes
the fact that the child was living at the time of the accident,
and as a result of the accident was strangled to death. Cer-
tainly such a child would be within the contemplation of the
statute. As any other living individual, such child was sub-ject to the vicissitudes of life, and in this case that life was
ended by a flagrant violation of the law governing operation
of motor vehicles." 3
The court, for authority in support of its interpretation of
§ 4511.181 Ohio Rev. Code, relied primarily upon: Williams v.
The Marion Rapid Transit, Inc.4; Jasinsky, Admr. v. Potts5 ; and
Stidham, Admx. v. Ashmore."
In Williams v. Marion Rapid Transit, Inc.7 the Supreme
Court of Ohio considered whether an infant may prosecute a
cause of action for injuries received while en ventre sa mere.
The court cited § 16 of Article I of the Ohio Constitutions
and held that the unborn seven-month fetus was, at the time
when the injuries were received, a person within the meaning
of that word as used by the framers of the Constitution.
The court based its decision upon the fact that when the
injuries were received the fetus was viable and capable of non-
parasitic existence, a fact made manifest in that case by the
child's actually surviving.
In the case of Jasinsky, Admr. v. Potts9 the Supreme Court
of Ohio expounded upon its interpretation of the word "person"
as set forth in the earlier Williams decision. The interpretation
was expanded to cover a case arising under the wrongful death
statute, which reads: "When the death of a person is caused by
wrongful act. .. ." 10 Specifically, the court established the right
of a child's personal representative to maintain an action under
3 Supra note 1.
4 152 Ohio St. 114 (1949).
5 153 Ohio St. 529 (1950).
6 109 Ohio App. 431 (1959).
7 Supra note 4.
8 Section 16, Article I, of the Ohio Constitution provides: "All courts shall
be open, and every person, for an injury done him in his land, goods, per-
son, or reputation, shall have justice administered without denial or delay."
9 Supra note 5.
10 Section 2125.01 Ohio Rev. Code (10509-166 GC).
2
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the wrongful death statute in cases where the infant is born alive
but subsequently dies of prenatal injuries.
Stidham Admx. v. Ashmore emphasized the point that a
viable unborn fetus is a "person," and concluded that a wrong-
ful death action may rightfully be maintained for the death of
such a fetus even if the child is not born alive. This writer re-
spectfully disagrees with the principal court's reliance entirely
upon civil case authority to support a criminal conviction. The
prevailing criminal law position is not in accord with the civil
law view set forth in the previously discussed cases cited as
authority in the principal case.
It is universally accepted that criminal laws shall be inter-
preted most favorably to the accused when construction is re-
quired.12 An equally well recognized criminal law rule requires
that an infant demonstrate its ability to exist independently of
the mother by actually doing so, before the child can be the sub-
ject of a homicide.13
The court in Williams v. The Marion Rapid Transit, Inc.
acknowledged this difference between civil and criminal law
when it stated: "It is quite difficult to reconcile the rule of
recognition of a separate existence of a child in order to punish
crime committed against it with complete rejection of such rule
in a civil suit. . ." 14
Some states have enacted statutes which provide punishment
under the name of manslaughter for the killing of an unborn,
"quick," child. However, these statutes are expressly limited to
intentionally-induced abortions. 1
It seems unnecessary and improper for the court in a crim-
inal proceeding to consider whether a viable unborn fetus is a
person, because the law appears settled. Until the statute is
amended by the legislature to include a viable fetus, a conviction
like that in Dickinson would seem to transcend traditional prin-
ciples of criminal justice.
RICHARD R. WILFONG
11 Supra note 6.
12 Krichman v. U.S., 256 U.S. 363 (1921); People v. Lund, 382 Ill. 213, 46 N.E.
2d 929 (1943); and Schooler v. U.S., 231 F. 2d 560 (1956).
13 Morgan v. State, 148 Tenn. 417, 256 S.W. 433 (1923). For a detailed
analysis of the rule, see Annot. 159 A.L.R. 525 (1941).
14 Supra note 4.
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DENIAL OF SPEEDY TRIAL--MANDAMUS FOR
DISMISSAL
Smith v. Hooey, 89 S. Ct. 575 (1969).
In 1960 Richard M. Smith, while a prisoner in the federal
penitentiary at Leavenworth, Kansas, was indicted in Harris
County, Texas on a charge of theft. He responded with a timely
request for a trial. After his other efforts to obtain a prompt
trial proved unsuccessful he eventually, in 1967, filed a motion
to dismiss for want of prosecution. When this motion failed to
elicit any response from the state, petitioner brought a mandamus
proceeding in the Texas Supreme Court asking for an order to
show cause why the pending charge should not be dismissed.
When his mandamus petition was denied petitioner applied for
certiorari to have the United States Supreme Court consider
the constitutional questions allegedly raised thereby.
Granting certiorari, the Supreme Court declared that the
Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial had application to the
case at hand. The Court reasoned that the timely assertion by
defendant-petitioner of his constitutional right to a speedy trial
gave rise to a corresponding duty on the part of the state to
bring him to trial without undue delay.' The Court rejected the
state's argument that Texas was, in this instance, free from
Sixth Amendment constraints, observing that this argument was
based on an erroneous conception of the nature of comity.
2
After discussing the history and purpose of the Sixth Amend-
ment guarantees and finding a violation thereof by Texas, 3 the
Court ruled that the order of the Texas Supreme Court (re-
fusing to grant mandamus) must be set aside4 and that the case
1 Ohio likewise conditions the right to a speedy trial on a timely demand
for one. State v. Butler, 19 Ohio St. 2d 55 (1969). Quoting from pages 56-
57: "The law of Ohio is that the right to a speedy trial is not self-executing.
Affirmative action on the part of an accused in the nature of a demand to be
tried is necessary to invoke the constitutional protection." See also Amend-
ed Senate Bill No. 355 which permits a prisoner to obtain a trial on any
charges outstanding against him in Ohio, upon written request and notice
to the court where the charges are pending. The bill provides that subject
to reasonable continuances, the prisoner must be tried within 180 days of
the request, or else the charges must be dismissed.
2 Texas had contended that the state courts were without the power and
authority to comply with the Constitutional mandate where, as here, the
petitioner was under federal detention.
3 89 S. Ct. 575, pp. 577-579, passim.
4 That is, that the mandamus should issue and that the state should be
compelled to show cause why the criminal charge should not be dismissed.
4
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must be remanded to that court for further proceedings. While
the holding may seem somewhat ambiguous and nondispositive
at first glance, it becomes clear upon reflection, that the effect
of the holding is to compel the Texas Supreme Court to order
a dismissal of the charge against Smith. If the Texas Court
finds on remand that there has been no breach of constitutional
duty, this would be inconsistent with the U. S. Supreme Court's
holding. But if such a breach of duty is once acknowledged,
then Texas must necessarily fail to show cause why it should not
grant a dismissal for want of prosecution.
Therefore, without drawing unjustified inferences, one can
interpret the decision in the principal case as follows: Given
the recognized right to a speedy trial, and given the correspond-
ing duty on the part of the state to affirmatively secure that con-
stitutional right, the breach of such a duty will result in the in-
ability of the state to show cause why it should not grant a dis-
missal.5 This view of the case is reinforced by the concurring
opinions of Justices White and Harlan.6
To hold that the state must dismiss is not the same as to
hold that mandamus should issue for dismissal. Such a use of
mandamus is clearly contrary to the recognized nature of the
writ.7 However, in the present case it appears that the writ is
usable to compel dismissal because of the unusual procedural
complexion of the case.
In summary, Smith v. Hooey seems to stand for the follow-
ing propositions: that the constitutional right to a speedy trial is
not self-executing; that once the right is affirmatively demanded,
there arises a duty on the part of the state promptly to try the
petitioner; and that the state cannot escape that duty by showing
that it honestly misconstrued the law.
CHARLES F. BRUMBACH
5 It logically follows that, as a procedural matter, mandamus is a proper
proceeding to effectuate dismissal under the given set of facts existing in
this case.
6 See 89 S. Ct.
7 Wilbur v. U.S., 281 U.S. 206, 50 S. Ct. 320 (1930); State ex rel. De Ville
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